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1. Introduction 
The two-tier system of local government has been the focus of 
much criticism in the post-reorganisation period. Indeed, to the two-
tier system have been attributed at one time or other virtually all 
the deficiencies of present-day local government, with all too little 
recognition of the danger of comparison of the old and new system, 
given the absence of adequate data, and the dramatic changes in the 
political climate since 1974. Public spending cuts, high inflation, 
and the disintegration of political consensus, would have led to 
conflict over rates and service levels between central and local gov-
ernment, whatever system was in operation. 
However, through the battles on spending and policy issues, it 
is possible to discern a serious critique of the system on two broad 
counts: 
(a) The size of the new authorities. 
(b) The nature of the two-tier system. 
Little empirical evidence exists to substantiate the first crit-
icism. Although the new ~uthorities have often been portrayed as re-
mote, bureaucratic and inefficient, as having led to increases in 
rates, spending and manpower, Page and Midwinter have shown that the 
1970s increases in rates and expenditure arose mainly from inflation 
and from reductions in central government grant. (l) Whilst manpower 
levels rose after reorganisation, this was part of a trend which 
began before reorganisation, and ceased around 1976, when reductions 
took place. 
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The second criticism, however, strikes at the very basis of the 
new system and raises a set of issues with which British government 
seems consistently unable to deal - how to divide power by area while 
maintaining an efficient and coordinated system of administration. 
British liberal constitutional and political theory contains 
within it a set of conventions and beliefs about the role of local 
government in the democratic system. Local authorities should be 
autonomous, should be answerable to their own constituencies and 
should have specified functions for which they, and not central gov-
ernment are responsible. This rationale underlay the reform of Scott-
ish local government, with functions divided between the two-tiers, 
each tier responsible to its own electorate for those functions all-
ocated to it. The Wheatley Commission, justifying the independence 
of the proposed two-tiers, wrote: 
"Like the region, the district exercises important func-
tions; but the overall range of functions is quite diff-
erent, and so is the place of the district in the scheme 
of local government.n(2) 
However, in a modern complex system of government characterised 
by the interdependence of practically all functions, 
possible to sustain. {
3
) In the next chapter, indeed, 
this view is im-
the Commission 
recognise that regions and districts will necessarily share common 
concerns but gloss over the resulting potential for conflicts of 
values and interests by calling for "ingenuity, willingness to ex-
periment and above all, patience and goodwill on the part of the re-
gional and district authorities themselves". {4 ) So, instead of try-
ing to structure intergovernmental relations to turn conflict into 
fruitful negotiation, the Commission effectively dismissed the prob-
lem by the typically British expedient of conjuring up an imaginary 
consensus. 
This comes out most clearly in the case of planning. Much of 
Wheatley's logic was based on the concept of the city-region as the 
ideal spatial form for strategic planning. Yet one of the most criti-
cised functional splits in local government reform was the separa-
tion of strategic planning from local planning and development con-
trol. Here again, government attempted to square the circle. In the 
debate on the Scottish reform, the Minister responsible declared at 
one stage that the government wanted "to resist a hierarchical situa-
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tion in which the second tier is subservient to the first tier". (S) 
Later in the debate, he effectively admitted that there was a strong 
element of interdependence and, indeed, hierarchy in the system. 
"Regional authorities have the general responsibility 
for planning in their area, they have a general over-
sight of planning as well as the preparation of reg-
ional reports and structure plans. But their proposals, 
no matter how well they draw them up, cannot be effective 
if they are not reflected accurately and in good time 
in local plans which will be the main means through 
which development control will be exercised.n(6) 
The Wheatley proposals themselves were modified by fierce lobbying 
in the political process, and the planning philosophy was undermined 
by the rejection of the Wheatley proposal that housing should be a 
regional function. {7 ) This created a further area of 'functional in-
terdependency' for housing provision is a major factor in strategic 
planning and infrastructure provision, and has close links with 
education and social work in service delivery. Writing of county-
district relations in England, Leach and Moore see functional inter-
dependency as a type of relationship which implies: 
"some kind of shared function where both county and 
district have power, in a situation where what one of 
the pair does inevitably affects the other".(B) 
This was also noted in SDD 76/1976, which stressed the necessity of 
close cooperation between district and region for successful imple-
mentation of housing policy. There was, as Crompton notes, about the 
introduction of housing plans, 
"an implicit belief in the potentiality of coordination 
between central government, regional authorities and 
district housing authorities despite the fact that in 
1977 many of the district authorities were already 
stretched to fulfil their existing functions 11 .{ 9 ) 
It would be unfair to claim that central government has ignored 
altogether the problems of functional interdependence. The Scottish 
Office has espoused the idea of 'partnership' and most of the 'plann-
ing systems' of the 1970s represented a recognition of the need for 
central-local, if not always region-district, negotiations over pol-
icy objectives, and priorities. Further, in 1979, the present Gov-
ernment appointed the Stodart Committee to consider possible changes 
in the boundaries and functions of Scottish local authorities, but 
without changing the basic structure. However, our contention is 
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that both the terms of reference of the Stodart Committee and its 
interpretation of those terms missed the fundamental problem. 
Stodart sought within the terms of its restricted remit, to 
recommend changes to the existing structure which would facilitate 
improvements in 'working relationships' among the new authorities.(lO) 
This they saw as requiring rationalisation in the case of concurrent 
functions, and transfers in the case of closely related services. 
The 72 recommendations in the Report were generally consensual, the 
only major disagreement arising between regions and districts being 
over the location of industrial development. Again,like Wheatley and 
subsequent reports, appeals for harmonious, working relations in the 
interests of coordination were made where no rationalisation was 
deemed possible. 
What was missing, however, was an appreciation of the fact that 
the major problem of region-district relations lies not in the small 
number of concurrent functions but in the much wider field of inter-
dependency of the major functions. In planning, for instance, the 
Committee concentrated on trying to tidy up the allocation of func-
tions while ignoring the major question of how regional and district 
interests should interact across the whole planning field. (ll) Once 
again, we see the pursuit of the illusory goal of functional indepen-
dence - to the point that Stodart fails even to mention Regional Re-
ports, a Scottish innovation of considerable potential as a vehicle 
for corporate intergovernmental planning. 
There has, of course, been much resentment shown by participants 
in local government over reorganisation, particularly from officers 
and members of the four counties of cities, and royal burghs, who 
transferred to district councils after reorganisation. This was par-
ticularly true of the case in point, relations between Glasgow Dist-
rict and Strathclyde Region, where there is still a great deal of 
disquiet, and in some cases resentment, at the 1975 reorganisation. 
Some people see a two-tier system as an inefficient replacement for 
the all-purpose Glasgow Corporation, and an inherent source of con-
flict. Others resent particularly Glasgow's downgrading to second 
tier status and the fact that, despite its size and independent his-
tory, the City is treated by the Region just as any other district. 
While these attitudes are most common in the District, especially in 
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those departments which can trace a lineal descent from bigger, more 
powerful departments in the old Corporation, there are also Regional 
officials who regret the passing of the Corporation and the division 
of the system. 
In 1981, however, two important events occurred. One was the 
publication of the government's response to Stodart, which made clear 
that no return to all-purpose status would take place for the City of 
Glasgow. The second was the seminar on Urban Government staged by the 
City of Glasgow under 'Project Turin', where strong similarities in 
attitudes to innovative management were to be seen in the speeches 
made by Councillor Jean McFadden, Labour Leader in the District Coun-
cil, and Councillor Ronald Young, Labour Group Secretary in Strath-
clyde. Discussions later took place with a view to improving rela-
tions and the 'provision of a total local government service' to 
the community. (l 2 ) As part of this initiative, joint training pro-
grammes were instituted, and the remainder of this paper is based on 
empirical research carried out to diagnose the problem areas in the 
relationship for training purposes, and more importantly, to assist 
in the search for solutions. While our research was confined to 
Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District, we feel that many of our 
findings are of general application. Indeed, the choice of two auth-
orities ruled by the same political party enables us to control for 
the effect of partisan division, to isolate the inter-organisational 
issues. Below, we set out under five main groupings, the type of 
problems encountered. 
2. Structure and Statutory Functions 
We have emphasised the ubiquity of functional interdependence 
in local government. This is particularly notable in planning, where 
there has been disagreement over responsibility for the Green Belt 
and over the call-in of planning applications. Eric Young's study 
found only 75 instances of call-in over a three-year period, half of 
which were by Grampian Region. On interdependence, Scottish Develop-
ment Department Circular 64/1976 asserted that: 
"when considering planning applications with implica-
tions for the provision of infrastructure it is im-
portant that district councils should, through close 
working relationships with the regional council, ensure 
that due account is taken of the region's responsibili-
ties11.(13) 
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As one observer of Strathclyde, Wannop, has noted: 
"The number of applications 'called-in' by Strath-
clyde as of regional significance is fractional -
one in a thousand generally. Seeking to have the 
Region decide such a small fraction scarcely seems 
a major intrusion on the District's rights •..• 
although for a period, Glasgow preferred to object 
to the Secretary of State in principle in all cases of 
'call-in'. A better accommodation between Re9ion and 
District seems now to have been reached.n(14) 
However, call-in still continues to arouse much ill-feeling. 
This appears to be because it is in practice impossible to draw any 
functional distinction between regional and district matters. Rather, 
the distinction is one of the constituency and scale of~ of 
two authorities operating in a single functional field, a point to 
which we return below. 
The ambiguity over responsibility was stated in a longer study 
by Eric Young, who noted that: 
"The broad terms of the statutory provisions on 'call-
in' by the regional authority leave a good deal of 
scope for argument as to whether or not 'call-in' is 
justified in a particular case". ( 15 ) 
Functional interdependency is evident in the relationship of the Re-
gional Roads Department to District Planning, which has the final say 
over development control matters, even when these involve roads and 
traffic. 
There are disputes over concurrent responsibilities in leisure 
and recreation and over the joint use of facilities by different 
authorities or departments. Street cleansing, cleansing of the motor-
way and winter emergency work have also suffered from ill-defined re-
sponsibilities. Problems have arisen over responsibility for making 
grants to outside bodies. Some of these conflicts and ambiguities 
have been resolved by agreement since 1975 or were dealt with in 
the Stodart Report. However, even after Stodart, shared responsi-
bilities will remain as an inherent feature of the system. 
3. Policies and Priorities 
We encountered no clear-cut examples of policy conflict between 
the Councils. This is not surprising, given that both are controlled 
by the same political party. Each council put the need to provide 
employment, and to tackle urban deprivation, as key elements in their 
corporate strategy. In the case of Glasgow, however, there was a re-
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lated concern with environmental decay, and the need to stem popula-
tion decline. Neither of those objectives is necessarily incompatible 
with the two previous objectives. Where the authorities differ is in 
the method of providing a policy framework within which specific de-
cisions can be made. Strathclyde's approach was to select small geo-
graphic areas for special treatment in terms of the deprivation stra-
tegy, through the identification of Areas for Priority Treatment, and 
joint approaches with the District known as Area Initiatives. (l
6
) In 
Glasgow, priorities of resource allocation are in broader terms, the 
housing department using stress indicators, and whilst priority has 
officially been given to GEAR (a multi-agency scheme), and the Area 
Initiatives, concern was also expressed for the priority of the Per-
ipheral Estates. As one study of GEAR has demonstrated, however, 
the sheer size of existing problems throughout the City made posi-
tive discrimination very difficult. 
"GEAR's strategy on housing appeared in 1979. The Dis-
trict Council's housing plans, made independently of 
GEAR, were unaffected by the GEAR project. Because they 
had been drawn up prior to the establishment of GEAR 
and because the Council stuck to its own strategy, which 
was subject to expenditure cuts~ no bending in favour of 
the GEAR area was possible. n(17 I 
Whilst policy differences are minimal, there are differences in 
standards, for instance between the District Planning and Housing 
Departments and the Regional Roads Department on road widths; be-
tween District Planning and Regional Water on the standard of res-
toration after the excavation by the Water Department of environment-
ally improved areas, and on parking standards. The Regional Roads and 
Planning departments have wanted more car-parking allocation for city 
private residential development than District Planning have thought 
necessary or possible; and in city-centre commercial developments 
the Region, in line with its general policy, has tried to restrict 
parking, leading to differences with District Planning. 
Differences in priorities between the authorities have given 
rise to a range of problems. For example, there was disagreement over 
the priority to be given to traffic management schemes in local 
planning between District Planning and Regional Roads. The provision 
of infrastructure for new developments has also caused some problems 
as District plans do not always fit in with Regional Departments' 
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views of the most economical future development of their water and 
sewerage system. The use of vacant sites has caused controversy whete 
the District has wanted to bring them into use immediately for in-
dustrial development but the Region has preferred to retain them for 
its own future use. 
In the environmental field, where Region and District are oper-
ating on the same sites, differences have arisen over priorities on 
pedestrianisation, over the priority of safety and scenic considera-
tions in motorway landscaping. In the programme to replace lead pip-
ing in housing, the Region has not always been able to replace its 
connections to the mains at the same rate as the District has replac-
ed piping in houses~ It has been suggested that this problem will be 
exacerbated when the District begins to receive special grants for 
replacement. 
Such differences often reflect differing scales of vision. Given 
the geographical scope of the respective authorities, the Region has 
responsibilities throughout the district but the District does not 
have responsibilities throughout the Region. So a decision which 
might be logical in the context of the District alone may not appear 
so in the context of the wider Region. Problems of this sort have 
arisen with regard to shopping development. In its structure plan, 
the Region has suggested restrictions on shopping development in cen-
tral Glasgow to avoid the creation of over capacity, blight and un-
even access at the level of the Region. The District, basing its view 
of the potential of the city alone and not taking into account plans 
for other districts, has planned for expansion in shopping far in 
excess of the Region's limits. It is problems such as this, over 
what sort of matters constitute 'regional' or Region's 'strategic' 
concerns, which account for many of the disputes over call-in of 
planning applications. There have been similar problems in planning 
for industrial development, with the District complaining that the 
Region's wider geographical remit prevents it giving proper atten-
tion to the special problems of Glasgow. In local plan-making, on 
the other hand, where the District's lead responsibility is statu-
torily clear and universally recognised and where few strategic 
issues have, as yet, arisen, there appears to have been little con-
flict. 
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ThesP sorts of problems also arise on an intra-authority basis. 
There is a disagreement between the District Planning and Housing de-
partments as to whether residential development should be steered to 
greenfield sites or to inner brownfield sites. This complicates the 
District's response to the Regional Structure Plan which raises the 
issue. Planning departments at both levels can find themselves in 
disagreement with other departments acting as landowners and develop-
ers. 
4. Problems of Planning and Management 
In local government, there is a well-known tendency for problems 
to be perceived differently by different departments and different 
professions. The problem is compounded where the departments and pro-
fessions are in different authorities. For instance, housing and so-
cial work have different attitudes towards eviction, or the problems 
of 'anti-social' tenants which tend to colour the approach of their 
respective councils. Community activism is often regarded by housing 
officers, as a source of opposition and tr· uble. To social workers, 
concerned with community development, it can be a positive phenomen-
on to be encouraged. Community development, indeed, is defined and 
evaluated from a number of quite different standpoints, by different 
departments and professions. 
These difficulties of problem definition and assessment are fur-
ther exacerbated by lack of adequate common data on matters like demo-
graphic forecasts, the extent of disability, or the housing needs of 
the elderly. 
Many difficulties arise because of discrepancies in the pro-
gramming of works by the two authorities, not because of consciously 
expressed priorities but for day-to-day managerial reasons. There is 
the familiar problem of the hole in the road being dug and filled in 
by a series of agencies in turn. In the Citizens Theatre renovation, 
the contribution of the Region, the improvement of the facade, lags 
behind that of the District (interior renovation) and the SDA {en-
vironmental landscaping). There are difficulties in the time-scale 
for comments by regional departments on planning applications; and 
the relationship amongst the procedures for obtaining planning permi-
ssion, building control consent and the roads warrant for new dev-
elopments has caused some confusion. Most of these problems arise at 
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the operational level and point to the need for better liaison and 
joint working amongst officers. 
Agency agreements have caused difficulties because of differences 
in priorities, specifications and standards between the two authorit-
ies. 
This has been observed over motorway and street landscaping. 
Agencies are also subject to change and withdrawal at short notice 
because of pressure for spending cuts, causing problems for long-
term planning by the affected authority. An example cited was that 
of Ruchill Laundry where withdrawal of the Region's custom may result 
in job losses in the District. In purely technical matters, where 
relationships are stable and there is little scope for discretion 
over standards and priorities, agencies have been more successful, 
though it is apparent that there is a trend to the abandonment of the 
agency principle. 
Costs are the most common source of disagreement arising from 
agencies or shared functions. Where the District has installed water 
and sewerage in new developments, to be adopted by the Region, pay-
ment has sometimes been held up because of arguments over specifica-
tion and documentation. The cost of community facilities used by both 
authorities has been disputed. Transfers of plant and machinery from 
the old to the new authorities caused arguments for years after re-
organisation. Transfer of land continues to be a vexed question with 
arguments over the price - previous, existing or new use value -
and allowance for clearance and improvements. Efforts by Region and 
District to minimise their spending on maintaining and landscaping 
gardens for the elderly appears to have had the perverse result of 
making both authorities pay more than they otherwise might, because 
of the inefficiency of their arrangements. In the case of certifica-
tion of football grounds, the Region charges a £500 fee but there is 
some annoyance at District level that they receive nothing, though 
their Building Control department puts in some of the necessary work. 
Many of the cost and payment problems have arisen because, under 
the old Corporation, informal inter-departmental arrangements were 
made which now have to be formalised and casted as part of the inter-
authority interchange, at a time of scarce resources. 
5. Organisational Issues 
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The new system of local government was barely approved by Par-
liament when the creation of formal inter-authority links was being 
advocated in documents such as the Paterson Report and the Morris 
Report. (lB) The liaison machinery at authority level is weak, and 
the joint elected member committee has been described to us as "a 
farce with no political heavyweights involved". There is a lack of 
machinery for coordination of the planning of capital programmes to 
provide a framework for joint action at all levels. This weakness of 
liaison reflects the difficulties we have already reviewed and the 
general tendency for departmentalism and fragmentation in local gov-
ernment. 
Cooperation at the level of service delivery is often inhibited 
by the fact that officers of Region and District are often not res-
ponsible for the same areas and do not have the same degree of dele-
gated authority. Authorities, and departments within them, tend to 
adopt managerial arrangements tailored to their own functional re-
quirements. Thus Glasgow's area management system is housing- led 
and organised territorially in accordance with this. The Region's 
Glasgow Education Division, on the other hand, is organised function-
ally and finds it difficult even to choose an officer to attend area-
based committees. Even within the District, it is difficult to devi~ 
a common area basis for Housing, which is concerned with council 
houses and Building Control, with its largely private sector con-
cerns, given the geographical segregation of public sector and pri-
vate housing in the city. 
The community development role is clearly area-based yet it de-
pends on an input by departments which may not have an area organi-
sation or may have an inappropriate one. There is, as we pointed out 
earlier, some disagreement about the nature and location of the wor~ 
problems of deprivation. This is reflected in the different initia-
tives undertaken, with the Region going for a form of area manage-
ment only in the initiative areas, while the District has adopted 
a comprehensive area management system. 
The lack of consistency in area delegation within and between 
authorities is one factor weakening formal liaison arrangements, 
such as the District's Area Management Committees, and the Region's 
Area Initiatives. Another is the political weakness of these commi-
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ttees in relation to departments and budgets. There is a tendency 
for them to concentrate on detailed matters within the limits of the 
authorities' policies rather than being a powerful influence on those 
policies themselves. There is a problem of communication of area pri-
orities to decision-making levels. {l9 ) 
In contrast to the weakness of formal organisational links, the 
network of personal contact among officers is a key element in rela-
tionships between authorities. There is a strong network dating from 
the old Corporation in which officers of Region and District served as 
colleagues. This encourages informal contacts to smooth out potential 
problems. It has been suggested that some officers recruited since 
reorganisation have developed a strong identification with the new 
authorities which inhibits cooperation. Joint training programmes 
(e.g. housing/social work, area management) are seen as useful in 
promoting personal links and a shared approach to problems. Despite 
party political linkages, attitudes among councillors are frequently 
antagonistic. The District Labour group made a forceful case for 
restoration of powers in its submission to Stodart, despite Strath-
clyde Region's overwhelming and seemingly permanent Labour control. 
6. Where Do We Go From Here? 
It has frequently been suggested that the solution to the pro-
blems of two-tier local government in Scotland lies in the establish-
ment of a single-tier system, under a Scottish Assembly. There is un-
doubtedly considerable merit in this suggestion but it does not pro-
vide the solution to the immediate problem, for two reasons. First, 
because we cannot in practice redraw the local government system on 
a tabula rasa. We must start from where we are now, recognising the 
strengths and weaknesses of the existing system and the cost of a 
further upheaval. Secondly, many of the problems we have identified 
would recur within a single-tier system. There would be the same pro-
blem of reconciling Glasgow's development needs and priorities with 
the strategic imperatives of the wider region of which it forms part. 
A large proportion of the problems of Region-District relation-
ships stern from different professional perspectives and priorities. 
These would not fade away with the establishment of a single-tier 
system. Crompton has noted, the problems of integration on an inter-
departmental basis which exist in the development of a comprehensive 
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approach to housing. 
"Housing plans are ambitious exercises. The problems 
of integrating and coordinating different departments 
and professions are substantial and were underestimated 
in the Manual. Consideration of the institutional 
realities (our emphasis) of the implementation process 
shows that policy change is not easily achieved."(20) 
It may be argued that cooperation is assisted because of shared 
political philosophy. Leach and Moore, however, found many examples 
of poor relations between councils administered by the same party in 
England. 
"A party political conflict may intensify any conflict, 
but the forces generating the conflict usually lie 
elsewhere." ( 21) 
Our argument throughout this paper has been that the essential 
problem is that of the interdependency of local government functions. 
It is this which has underlain much of the advocacy of corporate man-
agement in local government in recent years. What is now required is 
inter-authority corporate policy making, a joint approach to policy 
issues which recognises the legitimate differences of the two auth-
orities but also the need to reconcile and compromise over these 
differences. In our view, this can best be achieved through a comm-
on emphasis on decentralisation, with coordination at the point of 
service delivery, to present the citizen with what he or she tends 
in any case to see as a single local government service. But decen-
tralisation is not simply a bureaucratic device. It is also a means 
whereby the citizen and the local councillor can influence policy 
choice at the local level. The responses of both councils to date 
have been to superimpose new corporate machinery on a traditional 
system, with an emphasis on improving coordination rather than 
challenging traditional power-bases, the departmental and committee 
system. Future development would require not merely tinkering with 
area structures but also a fundamental rethinking about the role of 
the committee system,< 22 ) in the direction of advancing the 'mana-
gerial' role of councillors in matters of broad policy, resource 
allocation and performance review. This would then permit more spe-
cific decisions about services to be taken locally. 
Both councils have good records of innovative approaches to 
urban management. Given the demonstrable interdependence of the 
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